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Abstract  
 
Indian banking sector is passing through another crucial phase in its evolution 
with the Reserve Bank of India proposing the formation of holding companies in 
banking groups. This paper offers an analytical discussion about the proposed financial 
holding company (FHC) or banking holding company (BHC) that is claimed to offer 
considerable advantages as the banks will be much better protected against possible 
adverse effects from the activities of their non-banking financial subsidiaries. The paper 
recommends that the financial holding company (FHC) model ought to be pursued as a 
preferred model for the financial sector in India. In addition, the FHC model can be 
extended to all large financial groups – irrespective of whether they contain a bank or 
not. Accordingly, there can be Banking FHCs controlling a bank and Non-banking 
FHCs, which do not contain a bank in the group. 
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FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY STRUCTURE FOR INDIA 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The changing landscape of the global financial industry coupled with increasing M&A 
activities among financial institutions and increasing joint ventures and strategic alliances 
among financial institutions calls for certain tectonic shift in Indian financial sector too. Some 
of the underlying causes of global financial consolidation can be ascribed to cost savings and 
revenue enhancements, financial deregulation and globalization owing to technological and 
financial innovation, changing consumer demand, corporate and institutional demand, and 
shareholder pressure on financial performance. Globally, the most prevalent models under 
which financial conglomerates are organised straddle the entire spectrum, comprising a 
holding company model, wherein all bank as well as non-bank financial activities are 
undertaken through distinct subsidiaries of a parent holding company. A bank-subsidiary 
model requires the banks floating subsidiaries under them to undertake various non-bank 
financial activities; and a universal banking model necessitates that all financial activities are 
undertaken within a single entity.   
 
Indian financial services sector has also been witnessing a rise in the emergence of financial 
conglomerates. With the enlargement in the scope of the financial activities driven by the 
need for diversification of business lines to control the enterprise-wide risk, some of the 
players are also experimenting with structures hitherto unfamiliar in India. In this context, it 
is considered timely to take a review of some of the conglomerate structures, assess their 
suitability for the country given the prevailing legal, regulatory and accounting framework, 
and highlight the regulatory and supervisory concerns for the Reserve Bank emanating from 
such structures.   
 
The subject of the type of corporate form embraced by financial groups in India for 
undertaking a range of financial activities has gained significance from two distinctive, inter-
related, perspectives. The first being efficient corporate management within the groups 
meeting the growth and capital requirements of diverse entities. The second is the degree of 
regulatory comfort with diverse models, especially about the concerns relating to contagion 
risks.  
 
Banks, at present, in India are organized under the Bank-Subsidiary Model (BSM) in which 
the bank is the parent of all the subsidiaries of the group. The need and feasibility of 
introducing a financial holding company model in the Indian context is necessitated from the 
lessons drawn from the global financial crisis.  
 
2. Financial Holding Companies - Global experience 
Financial holding companies are entities that control regulated financial intermediaries: 
typically depository institutions (such as commercial banks or savings associations), 
insurance companies, or securities firms (Howell E. Jackson, 1997). Predominantly two 
holding company models for bank related conglomerates viz, Bank Holding Company (BHC) 
Model and Financial Holding Company (FHC) Model are observed worldwide. 
  
1. BHC Model: BHCs are companies that own or control one or more banks.  In USA, 
the Federal Reserve regulates these companies.  They were first introduced in Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956. Further, these companies can make only limited 
investments in the non-banking companies.   
  
2. FHC Model:  FHCs are companies that own or control one or more banks or non-
bank financial companies.  In USA, FHCs were created by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
(GLB) Act of 1999 as a way to expand the financial services activities of BHCs. GLB 
Act permits banks, securities firms and insurance companies to affiliate with each 
other through the FHC structure. FHCs can engage in activities other than banking as 
long as they are financial in nature. The most important of these are securities 
underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting, insurance agency activities and 
merchant banking. The requirement to have bank in the financial group is pre-
requisite for qualifying as an FHC in USA.    
 
At present, there are more than 600 FHCs in USA. Most of them are the BHCs, which 
have elected to become FHCs under the GLB Act. FHCs control approximately 80% 
of the entire banking system in USA. Other than USA, Canada, UK, Japan, France 
and some Emerging Asia countries such as Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong 
also have the FHC as a model of organization.  
 
In the case of European Union (EU), financial conglomerates are organized through a holding 
company model. Australia, based on recommendations of its Wallis Commission, has 
allowed the holding company model as part of liberalization of the range of activities that can 
be carried out within a conglomerate group containing banks. In Korea, it was the Asian 
crisis which triggered the move towards the holding company model in the financial sector. 
 
The recent global financial crisis has nevertheless reignited the debate on the nature and 
scope of the banks’ involvement with securities activities. The Volcker rule, which stipulates 
clear-cut separation between banking and proprietary trading and investments in hedge funds 
and private equity is at the heart of the legislative reforms in this direction. It is clearly an 
expression of concerns regarding the so-called marriage of traditional banking with 
investment banking.   
 
With regard to the form of conglomeration is concerned, the crisis can be termed as model 
agnostic. The FHC model in the US could not guarantee isolation of banks from non-bank 
financial activities as the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) structure allowed banks to 
undertake many activities directly. On the other hand, in EU where the Bank-Subsidiary 
Model was more predominant, the insufficiencies in consolidated capital requirements at the 
bank level were found to be obvious. Both under Holding Company Model (HCM) and 
Bank-Subsidiary Model (BSM), the individual banks were found to be under-capitalised even 
though the banking groups claimed to have adequate capital at the consolidated level. 
 
3. Major Types of Financial Holding Companies Structures  
 
A typical bank-centric organization structure, which is currently followed in India is shown 
below.  
  
Figure-1: A Typical Bank-Centric Organization Structure-Bank Subsidiary Model 
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In a banking or financial group, a holding company can be the parent of the group or an 
intermediate holding company. A multi-layered financial conglomerate may also have a few 
tiers of intermediate holding companies apart from the holding company at the top. 
Organisational structure of a typical FHC with a main banking subsidiary, other banking 
subsidiaries and other non-banking financial subsidiaries is given in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: A Financial Conglomerate with Holding Company at the Apex 
 
 
A financial conglomerate with a parent holding company and also an intermediate holding 
company is illustrated below. 
 
Figure 3: A Financial Conglomerate with Holding Company at the Apex as well as an 
Intermediate Holding Company 
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 4. Holding Companies in Banking Groups     
Across the globe, deregulation and financial consolidation have given way to the 
development of Financial Holding Companies—allowing commercial banking, insurance, 
investment banking, and other financial activities to be conducted under the same corporate 
umbrella. There are several ways of conducting different financial services in the same 
organization, like;   
• The Universal Bank as currently practiced in Germany, where all financial services 
are done within the bank;   
• The Bank Subsidiary Model, where non-banking activities are done in separately  
constituted subsidiaries of the bank;  
• The Bank Holding Company model, where non-banking activities are done in firms 
owned by a parent company that also owns the bank.   
All the above conglomerate models can have one or more layers of intermediate holding 
companies.     
 
Transforming into a bank holding company makes it easier for the firm to raise capital than as 
a traditional bank. The holding company can assume debt of shareholders on a tax-free basis, 
borrow money, acquire other banks and non-bank entities more easily, and issue stock with 
greater regulatory ease. It also has a greater legal authority to conduct share repurchases of its 
own stock. 
 
5. The Bank Subsidiary Model vs. the Holding Company Model  
On evaluating the comparative pros and cons of the equally prevalent Holding Company 
Model (HCM) vis-à-vis the Bank Subsidiary Model (BSM), one can observe that the 
universal banking model was not really an option in the Indian context given the entity-
focused regulatory approach and historical evolution of financial conglomerates.   
 
While the issues of conflict of interest and moral hazard arising from affiliation are there for 
all financial sector entities, these are most pronounced in case of banks because of the safety 
net considerations. Although there is no clear evidence that the traditional non-banking 
activities increase risk for banks, the recent financial crisis has proved beyond doubt that 
banks’ undue involvement in the off-balance sheet activities and sponsoring of SPVs could 
increase risk for them. Banks will have reputational risks, both under BSM and HCM models. 
 Under both BSM and HCM, the parent company straight away benefits from profits earned 
by the subsidiary. On the other hand, there is a difference in the nature of the exposure of the 
banks to the losses from the non-banking activities. While under BSM, the bank reaps the 
profits and bears the losses (depending on its equity stake and credit extended) associated 
with these activities, a bank owned by a holding company with non-bank affiliates, instead, is 
not directly exposed to non-bank losses, but at the same time may not benefit from any 
profits earned by non-bank affiliates.   
 
One of the key risks postured by the BSM model is that the parent bank is directly exposed to 
the functioning of various subsidiaries and any loss suffered by the subsidiaries inevitably 
affects the bank balance sheets. Further, the obvious risk from connexion of banks with non-
banks is the risk of transmission to non-bank affiliates of a subsidy implicit for banks in the 
safety net, deposit insurance, access to central bank liquidity, access to payment systems, 
with the attendant moral hazard. This subsidisation is more readily transferred to a subsidiary 
of bank and to some extent can be reduced through the holding company structure.   
 
In terms of philosophy and approach to regulation, FHC model makes it cleaner to focus on 
group-wide risks centrally from a systemic perspective. The FHC model of financial 
conglomeration seems to fit this new architecture relatively better as compared to the bank-
subsidiary model.   
 
Although the HCM is not decisively superior to the BSM, yet it offers some distinctive 
advantages as detailed below.  
a) As under the HCM, the subsidiaries will not be directly held by the bank, the 
responsibility to infuse capital in the subsidiaries would rest with the holding 
company. As such, HCM model is superior in eliminating capital constraints and 
enabling expansion in other financial services. 
b) The HCM model fares better in terms of direct impact of the losses of the subsidiaries, 
which would be borne by the holding company unlike in the case of BSM where it 
would be up streamed to the consolidated balance sheet of the bank. 
c) Management of individual entities in a disaggregated structure is obviously easier and 
more effective. Under the HCM, unlike in the case of BSM, the bank’s board will not 
be loaded with the responsibility of managing the group’s subsidiaries.  
d) From the systemic perspective, the HCM enables a better regulatory oversight of 
financial groups in line with the emerging post-crisis consensus of having an 
identified systemic regulator responsible inter alia for oversight of systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFI). 
e) The HCM offers the requisite variance in regulatory approach for the holding 
company vis-à-vis the individual entities.   
f) In addition, the HCM model allows for an effective resolution of different entities as 
compared with BSM where liquidation of the parent bank may make the liquidation 
of subsidiaries inevitable. 
 
6. Why FHCs/ BHCs in India  
In terms of existing instructions, a bank’s aggregate investment in the financial services 
companies including subsidiaries is limited to 20% of the paid up capital and reserves of the 
bank. However, in a FHC/ BHC structure, this restriction will not apply as the investment in 
subsidiaries and associates will be made directly by the FHC/ BHC. As the subsidiaries are 
separated from the banks, their growth of the subsidiaries/associates would not be constrained 
because of capital.   
 
In the case of public sector banks, the Government holding through a FHC/ BHC will not be 
possible in the existing statutes. However, if statutes were amended to count for effective 
holding then, the most important advantage in shifting to FHC/ BHC model would be that the 
capital requirements of banks' subsidiaries would be de-linked from the banks’ capital.    
 
7. Introduction of FHCs/ BHCs in India – Some Issues  
Legal Issues for FHCs/ BHCs for India  
1) Need for a separate law: Some countries have a separate legislation for regulating 
FHCs/ BHCs. If we have to have only BHCs, the purpose could be achieved perhaps 
even by amending the BR Act, 1949. However, in case it is decided to go for FHCs by 
expanding the scope of permissible financial activities by including all possible 
financial services, a separate Act on the lines of GLB in USA may be required.   
2) Minimum threshold for recognizing a BHC for regulatory purposes:  In USA, a BHC 
is a company which directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons 
owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of voting 
securities of a bank and or controls in any manner the election of a majority of the 
directors or trustees of the bank
1
. A suitable threshold will have to be incorporated in 
the proposed statute in the Indian context too. 
3) Permissible activities of FHCs/BHCs: Internationally, there are restrictions on the 
activities of BHCs or FHCs
2
. While BHCs are not allowed to invest in non-banking 
related activities, subject to certain exceptions, restrictions in the case of FHCs mostly 
relate to investments in non-financial commercial enterprises. Further, the BHCs and 
FHCs are required to be non-operating in nature. Appropriate, restrictions on these 
lines will have to be prescribed by us. 
4) Cross holdings among FHCs/BHCs: Cross holdings among BHCs would create 
intractable regulatory problems. Some limits would be necessary in this regard. 
 
Regulatory issues relating to FHCs/BHCs 
Capital adequacy framework  
Basel-II norms: Capital adequacy framework for FHCs/BHCs would be governed as per 
Basel-II norms. The capital adequacy framework would be applicable to the BHC at 
consolidated level wherever the entire group would qualify as the ‘banking group’. (If More 
than, 50% of the group’s assets are banking assets and more than 50% of the income is 
derived from the banking activities)
3
. In other cases, the capital adequacy would be applied at 
the banking subsidiary level.  
 
Ownership of Banking FHCs  
In India, the ownership norms are not the same for the public and private banks. While the 
provisions of the respective statutes govern the ownership structure of public sector banks, in 
the case of private sector banks, the ownership and governance framework put in place by 
RBI regulates it. The exodus by a banking group to the FHC structure would result in the 
bank becoming a subsidiary of the FHC. As by definition, an FHC will control a bank, 
keeping with the spirit behind the legal provisions and the ownership and governance 
framework, therefore, it would be essential to apply the same ownership and governance 
framework for the banks to their respective FHCs. For example, in order to remain consistent 
with the provisions of the Nationalisation Acts, in the case of nationalized banks, it would 
entail Government of India retaining a minimum stake of 51% in the FHC and foreign 
                                                          
1
 Bank Holding Company, Supervision Manual, Federal Reserve, New York, USA 
2
 Financial Holding Companies: Bill C-8 and New Options for Financial Conglomerates ( in Canada) 
3
 FSI  Connect, FSI 
investment not exceeding 20%.  Similarly, in the case of a FHC controlling a private sector 
bank, it would entail the acknowledgement for acquisition or transfer of shares for any 
acquisition of shares of 5 per cent and above of the paid up capital of the FHC. 
 
Need for a Separate Act   
A dedicated Act has been enacted for regulation of FHCs in most of the countries. In the US, 
FRB is the regulator of BHCs and FHCs. In Australia, Canada, Cayman Islands, Colombia, 
Japan, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, and United Kingdom a single regulator oversees the 
activities of all financial conglomerates as a whole. In the case of Argentina, Austria, Hong 
Kong, Israel, Philippines, Spain and Switzerland identity of the lead regulator for a financial 
conglomerate is determined based on the financial conglomerate’s major activity. In France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, South Africa, Turkey and Uruguay financial 
conglomerates operate without a single or lead regulator.   
 
In the case of India, RBI Act of 1934 is not deemed adequate to regulate and supervise the 
FHCs by RBI, as the legal powers are required to regulate comprehensively and exercise 
consolidated supervision on the FHCs are not provided for in the provisions governing 
NBFCs contained in the RBI Act. In particular, RBI Act do not confer powers to change the 
management of the holding company or give direction as to the kind of other subsidiaries 
etc., collect information from and inspect the subsidiaries of the FHCs and the application of 
bank-like ownership restrictions on the FHCs. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Financial conglomerates have evolved predominantly over the second half of the twentieth 
century, and have become exceptionally significant in recent years. The major economic 
benefits from conglomerates are the suitability to realize potential economies of scale and 
scope and to gain synergies across complementary business lines. These economies result in 
enhanced operational efficiency and effectiveness owing to lesser costs, reduced prices, and 
enriched innovation in products and services. Though the empirical benefits of such financial 
conglomerates are uncertain, of late these organizations indeed have gained in prominence. 
Yet, there seems to be a steady trend towards increasing conglomeration in several countries. 
It is also opined by some observers that regulatory authorities have encouraged consolidation 
in the financial services industry in order to facilitate enhanced diversification, capitalization, 
and investments in banking information technology, and to lessen the supervisory burden 
where banking organizations are larger and more visible (and thus open to increased public 
scrutiny). 
 
Indian banking sector is passing through another crucial phase in its evolution with the 
Reserve Bank of India proposing the formation of holding companies in banking groups. RBI 
has suggested that a financial holding company (FHC) or a banking holding company (BHC) 
will offer considerable advantages as the banks will be much better protected against possible 
adverse effects from the activities of their non-banking financial subsidiaries. In view of the 
above, the financial holding company (FHC) model ought to be pursued as a preferred model 
for the financial sector in India. In addition, the FHC model can be extended to all large 
financial groups – irrespective of whether they contain a bank or not. Therefore, there can be 
Banking FHCs controlling a bank and Non-banking FHCs, which do not contain a bank in the 
group. 
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